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in D. T. Suzuki’s Nostalgic Double Journeys
hagiwara takao
DAISETZ Teitaro Suzuki’s long life (1870-1966) closely parallels the his­tory of modem Japan since the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Like modem 
Japan, Suzuki’s life and ideas are a complex mixture of the “West” and the 
“East,” modernity and tradition. The traditional elements of Suzuki’s work 
center on Zen Buddhism, while the “Western” elements focus on American 
sensibilities which he directly experienced over the nineteen-odd years he 
lived in the United States.1
By the time he went to America at the rather young age of twenty-six, 
Suzuki had already attained satori (1'§ 0 ) under the young Zen master Shaku 
Soen (1859-1919).2 Suzuki’s Zen is radical in two seemingly oppo­
site senses. It is radical because his satori is a breakthrough of what is called
* This essay is an extensively revised and developed version of the paper “Japan and the 
West in D. T. Suzuki,” presented at the International Symposium on “Nostalgic Journeys: 
Literary Pilgrimages between Japan and the West,” held at the University of British 
Columbia, September 1999. I wish to thank Prof. Kinta Kiyohide for his generous assistance 
in helping me access early writings of D. T. Suzuki. I would also like to thank Ms. Peggy 
Fitzgerald, Prof. Christine Cano and Prof. Margot Harrison for their astute and generous edi­
torial advice and assistance. Unless otherwise specified, all the English translations of the pas­
sages quoted in this essay are mine.
1 Suzuki’s initial stay in America lasted eleven years (1897-1908). His subsequent 
sojourns in the States (which were sometimes interrupted by his travels to Mexico and 
Europe) are as follows: 1949-1952; 1953-1954; 1955-1959.
2 Shaku Soen was a very open-minded man for a Zen priest in those days, who, despite his 
master’s opposition, studied at Keio University. After attending the World Parliament of 
Religions held in Chicago in 1893, Soen recommended Suzuki to Paul Carus, who needed an 
assistant for his English translation of Lao Tze’s Tao Te Ching itSsg. 
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the bottomless bottom of traditional Buddhist “truth”3; it is also radical in its 
incorporation of modem “Western” elements, including English, to express 
verbally his satori experience via Zen shiso or Zen thought. In spite of this 
second radical element, the unorthodox nature of Suzuki’s Zen seems to 
reside primarily in the first sense, in that it is deeply rooted in the traditional 
Mahayana teachings. It is this radical element derived from tradition that has 
wrongly led many in the “West” to criticize Suzuki and Zen in general, 
claiming that Suzuki is a narcissistic cultural and/or militaristic nationalist, 
or that Zen is an existential hoax. These criticisms arise from, and in turn 
point to, the fundamental and crucial difference between the “West” and 
“Japan” or, more generally, between the “West” and the “East.”
3 Scholars like Matsumoto Shiro and Hakamaya Noriaki argue that Zen is kitaisetsu (SIT 
IK, Skt. dhatuvada) or essentialism, and that because of this it is not Buddhism as preached by 
the Buddha. Whether or not Zen concurs with the Buddha’s Buddhism, I don’t think that Zen 
is essentialist. This is because of its soku-hi logic, on which I will further elaborate later in this 
essay.
4 SDZS 2, p. 226. Hereafter, quotation marks around such terms as “East/West,” 
“Japanese” and “Western” will be omitted for stylistic reason, but they should be assumed, 
unless these terms refer to actual geographical regions and/or ethnic groups.
5 Maraldo 1994, pp. 336-40.
I consider the difference between “West” and “East” to be not so much a 
geographical and/or racial one as one of sensibilities and mindsets: the one 
dualistic, the other non-dualistic. Suzuki says: “When we geographically 
talk about East and West, we must draw a boundary somewhere. Rather, it is 
our mind that is Eastern or Western.”4 I will further examine the East-West 
issue later when discussing Suzuki’s soku-hi (BP^) logic (A is A because A 
is not A) and Maraldo’s criticism of what he calls Suzuki’s “spiritual nation­
alism.”5 Here, I wish to touch briefly on how I have come to hold the above 
views regarding the Western and Japanese mindsets. My first encounter with 
Zen and D. T. Suzuki took place during my high school years. Although I 
majored in English at a Catholic university in Tokyo, my interest in Zen and 
Suzuki was further stimulated by the knowledge that many Catholic priests, 
including Thomas Merton, William Johnston, and Heinrich Dumoulin, were 
seriously interested in Zen Buddhism. While impressed by their erudition 
and profound understanding of Zen, I sensed a significant difference 
between their Catholic, monotheistic sensibilities and those of non-monothe- 
istic Zen. This difference seemed to parallel that between English literature, 
my major, and my own indigenous sensibility. I soon realized that Suzuki’s 
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experience with Zen and Western sensibilities paralleled my own. Ever 
since, my principal academic interest has lain in drawing analytical compar­
isons between East and West, or more specifically, between Japan and the 
West.
Though I would continue my studies in North America, and currently 
teach Japanese and comparative literature at an American university, my 
twenty-five year stay in Canada and America has not altered the basic view 
of Japan and the West I acquired through both Suzuki’s writings and direct 
contacts with Canadians and Americans. Put simply, the Western mindset is 
dualistic or monotheistic; that of the East or Japan, non-dualistic or non- 
monotheistic. In my view, this fundamental difference underlies what I per­
ceive to be fatally misdirected criticisms raised by many Western, and some 
Japanese critics against Suzuki and Zen in general.
I
Below I elaborate on this difference by examining a selection of Western 
criticism of Zen and Suzuki. This examination will also shed light on the 
nature of Suzuki’s “nostalgic double journeys” to both the past (traditional 
Japan) and the future (the modem West).6 I will begin by discussing the 
“orthodox” example of such criticism by the writer Arthur Koestler, who 
derides Zen as “an existential hoax” at best and “a web of solemn absurdi­
ties” at worst.7 The point of Koestler’s criticism—also a basic criticism di­
rected against Suzuki and Zen in Rude Awakenings, on which I will touch 
shortly—is that Zen and Buddhism lack a code of social ethics, a serious 
omission in Koestler’s view. In The Lotus and the Robot, Koestler writes of 
several discussions that he and his friends had with Zen abbots through inter­
preters:
7 Koestler 1961, p. 233.
They [the abbots] were emphatic in their denials that religion had 
any bearing on social ethics. When we asked them whether they 
were indifferent to the persecution of religion in totalitarian coun­
tries, one of them answered:
6 See the following passage from Jean Paul, quoted by Ernst Bloch:
I say: Why does one forget about a superior and unique quality of music? About its 
power to make one nostalgic, not for the old, deserted land, but for a land that hasn’t 
been stepped on, not for a past, but for a future? (Bloch 1985, p. 200.)
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‘A horse eats in Tokyo and a horse in Osaka is no longer hungry.
A Sputnik goes up in Moscow and the shares fall in New York.’
That was in the classic koan tradition, and it got us nowhere.8
8 Ibid., p. 272.
9 Ibid., p. 273
10 Ibid., p. 274.
11 SDZS 2, p. 21; SDZS 3, pp. 184-92.
Koestler further questions the abbots by quoting one of Camus’ heroes who 
“ignored the cry of a drowning woman, and was subsequently destroyed by 
guilt.” “After a few meaningless exchanges,” Koestler writes, “one of the 
abbots said: ‘Guilt is a Christian idea. Zen has no home. It is glad for con­
verts, but does not seek to make proselytes.’ At least this was the version 
given to us by one of our lamentable translators; but it fitted the general trend 
of the discussion.”9
At another discussion, Koestler’s group asked a renowned Buddhist schol­
ar how the Buddhist ideal of tolerance would deal with an evil such as 
Hitler’s gas chambers. The scholar answered, “That was very silly of him 
[Hitler] . . . Evil is a Christian concept. Good and evil exist only on a relative 
scale.”10 11Koestler concludes that Zen has nothing to contribute to the moral 
recovery of Japan—or any other country.
Aside from Koestler’s “lamentable” translators, the real cause of what 
seem to be dialogues at cross-purposes between Zen and the Western mind 
is, I believe, that the two function on two fundamentally and crucially differ­
ent levels. These dialogues play out like a match between a traditional 
Japanese sumo wrestler and a Western-style wrestler, an intellectual and 
spiritual contest between two fundamentally different mindsets. Suzuki 
repeatedly points out that the Western mindset is based upon the division of 
God and the world (or God and the devil), and that it tries to “unify” the two, 
whereas the Eastern mindset functions the other way around; or more pre­
cisely, in the latter mindset, that “unity” (or better, non-division) already 
underlies division.11 Suzuki calls this kind of superimposition the logic of 
soku-hi (A is A because A is not-A).
Before I discuss Suzuki’s soku-hi logic further, however, I would like to 
touch on some of the most recent criticisms directed against Suzuki and Zen. 
In the recently published Rude Awakenings, a collection of essays on Zen 
and the Kyoto School centered on the philosopher Nishida Kitaro ® EB 
(1870-1945, who was Suzuki’s close friend), Christopher Ives attacks 
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Suzuki’s alleged militaristic nationalism by quoting, in his own English 
translation, a passage from one of Suzuki’s earliest writings, Shin shukydron 
(A New Treatise on Religion}, published in 1896:
There is a violent country [China], and insofar as it obstructs our 
commerce and infringes upon our rights, it directly interrupts the 
progress of all humankind. In the name of religion, our country 
refuses to submit itself to this. For this reason, unavoidably we 
have taken up arms. [. . .] For the sake of justice and justice alone, 
we are simply chastising the country that represents injustice, and 
there is nothing else we seek. This is a religious action.12 13(Prob­
lematic parts underlined by Hagiwara.)
12 Ives 1994, p. 17.
13 SDZ 23, p. 139-40.
14 Incidentally, I think it is historically inaccurate to perceive the Ch’ing dynasty as 
“China,” that is, a unified nation state like the People’s Republic of China. The Ch’ing 
(Manchu) dynasty invaded and conquered the Ming dynasty, which in turn had established
Ives’ translation seems to me a distortion of Suzuki’s original, which with 
my modifications would read:
Thus, should there be a violent country, and insofar as it obstructs 
our commerce and infringes upon our rights, it directly interrupts 
the progress of all humankind. In the name of religion, our country 
refuses to submit itself to this. Thereupon, unavoidably we will 
take up arms. [. . .] For the sake of justice and justice alone, we are 
simply chastising the country that represents injustice, and there is 
nothing else we seek. This is a religious action. (Modified parts 
underlined.)
The original is as follows.
T..................
getfnf®jRtrNN.
Judging from the time when Suzuki wrote Shin shukydron, he might have 
had China (Ch’ing dynasty) in mind when he refers to “a violent country,” 
but he never mentions “China” in his treatise.14 Again, judging from his 
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time, Suzuki even might have had Russia or other Western countries in mind. 
However, Ives argues that Suzuki advocates and justifies Japan’s attack on 
China in the Sino-Japanese war. Apparently, this argument is based on the 
reading of Suzuki by Ichikawa Hakugen rffhlSK (1902-1986), who quotes 
the above passage and somewhat hastily identifies the “violent country” as 
“China.”15
Aside from the issue of the correct identification of “a violent country,” I 
consider Ichikawa’s critique of Suzuki and Zen to be, in the final analysis, 
“Western” in that it is based, in the end, on a binary oppositional mindset. In 
this sense, his critical stance is essentially the same as that of Koestler and his 
successors in Rude Awakenings, and thus his criticism of Suzuki misses the 
mark. In his “Zen Buddhist Attitudes to War,” which is also included in 
Rude Awakenings, Hirata Seiko discusses Ichikawa’s distinction
between two kinds of freedom: “desecularized freedom” OKifW A A) and 
“secular freedom” (WSWg A). Notes Hirata:
When Zen speaks of freedom, it is usually in the sense of desecu­
larized freedom, as in the famous line in the Record of Lin-chv. 
“Become a master of your circumstances; wherever you stand is 
the right place” (ISijfilTA' This kind of freedom is at­
tained when one is able to accept life just as it is, when one is able 
to say, like the Soto master Ryokan, “In times of misfortune, mis­
fortune is fine.” Such freedom persists even in the midst of suffer­
ing.
But desecularized freedom is not able to bring about political or 
social reform. Freedom of the type achieved through the American 
and French Revolutions—freedom from political oppression—is 
what Ichikawa calls “secular freedom.” Desecularized freedom is 
vertical by nature and secular freedom is horizontal. For Ichikawa, 
the true freedom of Zen today lies at the point where these vertical 
and horizontal planes intersect.16
itself by overturning the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty. Moreover, not only did the Ch’ing dynasty 
rule the conquered Ming (Han) people by utilizing the latter’s bureaucrats and political sys­
tems, it had to allow other ethnic groups within its territories, such as the Tibetans, the 
Mongols, and the East Turkmens, a large degree of politico-social independence and autono­
my.
15 Ichikawa 1993, p. 36.
16 Hirata 1994, pp. 11-12.
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If Hirata’s interpretation of Ichikawa’s ideas of freedom as stated here is 
accurate, Ichikawa’s “point where these vertical and horizontal planes inter­
sect” is, it appears to me, far from “the true freedom of Zen,” since 
Ichikawa’s “point” is ultimately dualistic in its presupposition of the two 
planes or axes that intersect it. Hirata argues that “the world of Zen is not 
located at the point where the horizontal and vertical dimensions of human 
life intersect, but at the point where both dimensions drop out of the pic­
ture.”17 In my view, this “pointless point” is the locus of Suzuki’s soku-hi 
logic, upon which I will later elaborate in connection with such interrelated 
issues as self and the other, ethics, God, love and compassion, and “bite” and 
“nip.”
17 Ibid., p. 13.
18 Unno 1997, p. 247.
19 See Hirata 1994, pp. 8-11.
20 See, for instance, Stinnett 2000.
In any case, it seems to me that both Ichikawa and Ives have drawn a dis­
torted image of Suzuki as a militaristic nationalist. I also think it unfair that 
Ives, and Ichikawa to a certain degree, ignoring Suzuki’s historical location, 
single out his Shin shiikyoron, a treatise written when he was only twenty- 
six, in order to criticize him. As Taitetsu Unno has remarked in an essay on 
the Kyoto school, “Whenever we criticize past thinkers, we must remember 
that they are of another age in a different political climate, facing their own 
unique problems which may be beyond our comprehension.”18 It is not dif­
ficult to criticize in hindsight Suzuki’s lack of a bird’s-eye perception and 
foresight of the world situation around the turn of the 19th century and a few 
decades later. However, when Japan was dragged into the international 
power struggles between Western imperialist nation states around the mid- 
19th century, to Suzuki and many other Japanese, their situation must have 
seemed to be primarily that of self-defense, survival and independence rather 
than wayward imperialist invasions of the neighboring countries.19 How 
many of us now can see, even in hindsight, World War II not merely as strug­
gles between the Allies (the good) and the Axis countries (the evil), but pre­
dominantly as the imperialist and colonialist wars between the first and the 
late comers?20 And this imperialism is arguably a culmination of modem 
Western history, which in turn has its roots in the ancient Greco-Roman and 
the Judeo-Christian civilizations. Needless to say, this kind of perception is 
not to exonerate the atrocities perpetrated by both the Allies and the Axis
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countries that engaged in the imperialist wars. However, it will certainly pro­
vide us with a more nuanced view of the issue in question as a whole and, 
more specifically, of the situation in which Suzuki was placed around the end 
of the 19th century.
We should also be aware that, combining rationalistic thinking with the 
Zen spirit, Suzuki had relativized the “nation state” very early in his career, 
and was strongly critical of the Emperor system and Japan’s militarism 
before and during the so-called Pacific War.21 He also repeatedly criticized 
the feudalistic backwardness of Japanese society and customs as seen, for 
example, in the empty formalities of Japanese people and the poor housing 
conditions.22 These criticisms, however, reflect his deep love and concern 
for his country. I think that Suzuki’s type of nationalism, should it be called 
such, neither contradicts with Zen philosophy nor constitutes a strong criti­
cism of any individual or nation. Promoting the “national interest” of one’s 
own country would not necessarily contradict with one’s pacifist ideology. 
Otherwise, we would immediately have to put into action the logical conclu­
sions of Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (the tenet of whose 
arguments on the constructing of nation states seems to me to be irrefutable): 
a successive return of a nation’s land/territory to the former inhabitants, as 
well as the total abolishment of borders.
21 His criticism of the Emperor system and the ideology of kokutai (HIT, national polity) 
dates back to the early period of his stay in America. See SDMS, pp. 241, 244-45, 278; 
Suzuki 1899b, pp. 70-71; and Suzuki 1899c, pp. 71-72. Also, see Kirita 1994, pp. 54-55 and 
Unno 1997, pp. 262-64.
22 SDZ 17, pp. 169-82; SDMS, pp. 257, 296, 301,321; Kirita 1994, pp. 56-57; Unno 1997, 
p. 264.
II
The question of nationalism parallels that of “self,” or better, “self-identity,” 
which in turn is related to the issue of the Other and that of “nostalgic jour­
ney.” Zen’s soku-hi logic (A is A because A is not-A), which underlies these 
issues, explains the seeming contradiction between Suzuki’s relativization of 
“nationalism” and his sincere concern for his native country. In soku-hi 
logic, nationalism (a metaphor of one’s own “self”) is both affirmed and 
negated at the same time: one is neither oneself nor the Other, or (“topolog­
ically”) both at the same time. Suzuki’s “nostalgic double journeys” have 
the same logical mechanism: his nostalgia for the past (i. e., the Zen tradition
136
HAGIWARA: JAPAN AND THE WEST IN D.T. SUZUKI
Figure 1 Figure 2
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and Japan’s heritage) “topologically” (as in “this” and the “other” sides of 
the Mobius band) twists into his “nostalgia” for the future: modem 
(“Western”) sensibilities, or vice versa (see Figure 2).
Below, I will further elaborate on these issues by examining the criticisms 
directed against Zen and Suzuki in Rude Awakenings, in which Jan Van 
Bragt, for instance, argues that the logic of soku-hi annihilates the Other, 
because of its homogeneous and self-referential non-dualism23 (a criticism, 
also shared by other critics like Sharf).24 On the other hand, in the same 
book, Maraldo criticizes Suzuki’s Japanese spirituality (nihonteki reisei E3 A 
frJsEll) as a cultural/spiritual nationalism,25 while Robert Sharf condemns 
Suzuki’s Zen as a twentieth-century construct.26 These criticisms, sophisti­
cated though they may be, are along the lines of Koestler’s, and arise, in my 
opinion, from the fundamental and crucial difference in premises or logical 
arenas between Western and Zen thought. Zen’s soku-hi logic appears 
homogeneous and tautological in the Cartesian-Newtonian homogeneous 
temporo-spatiality (i. e., on the object level), the basis of the Aristotelian law 
of identity, which engenders, in my view, Koestler’s sense of social ethics, 
Maraldo’s and others’ negative view of nationalism, and Sharf’s criticism of 
Suzuki’s Zen as a modern construct. The soku-hi logic is not a homogeneous 
logic, because it has a “topological” twist built into it just as does the Mobius 
band or the Klein bottle. “Shiki (-gj) and ku (?£)” or “A and not-A” are not
23 Van Bragt 1994, pp. 252-54.
24 Sharf 1994, pp. 50-51.
25 Maraldo 1994, p. 339.
26 Sharf 1994, pp. 44-51.
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homogeneously identical, as indicated by the cross-point of the horizontal 
(s/zib’/A) and vertical (Aiz/not-A) axes (see Figure 1), but “topologically 
identical” (see Figure 2).
Suzuki often points out that while the West focuses on the dualistic state 
following God’s decree, “Let there be light,” Zen concentrates on the state 
before God created the world, or more precisely, on the “moment” he says, 
“Let there be light.”27 But this “moment” is not T. S. Eliot’s “still point of 
the turning world” (Four Quartets') or the point at which the coincidence of 
opposites (e. g., the noumenal and the phenomenal) takes place, as Sharf, 
from the homogeneous standpoint of identity, would mistakenly put it28 (see 
Figure 1). Rather, it is a “moment” at which eternity, kit, the noumenon (or 
the divine) “topologically crosses” time, shiki, the phenomenon (or the mun­
dane) (see Figure 2). This “topological moment,” a “topological synthesis” 
of eternity/ death and time/life, is the “locus” of what Suzuki calls reisei (St 
ft) or spirituality, the source not of love, but of compassion. This “moment” 
is also the ultima Thule of Suzuki’s “nostalgic double journeys,” whose 
apparently opposite “goals”—one is past/Japan, and the other, future/the 
West—ultimately “coincide” in his “fumo mishd izen no shinmenmokii” (F 
@; one’s true face/self [that “exists”] before one’s father 
and mother were bom). This “true face/self” (shinmenmoku) is the “true 
Other” or what the Zen master Rinzai (Chin. Lin-chi) would call 
“s/iaAzznzhz danjo no ichi mui no shin’nin” (^S]H±0—the true 
man with no title who sits on a mass of reddish flesh). One encounters this 
true self/man (the Other) in the eternal past or in the eternal future, which 
means that one will never meet it (in history or this three-dimensional tem- 
poro-spatiality), which in turn means that one has already met it here and 
now at the “topological cross section” of “time” and “eternity.” Rinzai’s 
“true man with no rank” (etemity/noumenon) sits here and now “on a mass 
of reddish flesh” (phenomenon or this world).
27 SDZ 27, pp. 63-64, 264.
28 Sharf 1994, p. 50. This is a fatal mistake, and this alone indicates that the foundation of 
his entire criticism of Zen and Suzuki, sophisticated and convincing as it may sound, is very 
shaky, or at least that his criticism is totally misdirected.
Thus, the “goal” of Suzuki’s “nostalgic journey” is not limited to tradi­
tional Japan, his native country and culture; his “goal” is nowhere, and thus 
it can be anywhere, be it America, India, or any other earthly country and 
culture. This is the true nature of what I call Suzuki’s “nostalgic double jour­
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neys,” which critics like Koestler, Ives, Sharf, Maraldo, and Van Bragt 
would incorrectly label as “narcissistic and homogeneous cultural/spiritual 
nationalism.” They would argue that this kind of nationalism annihilates the 
tension of good and evil and the Other’s ethical struggles for human rights in 
the asymmetrical I-Thou relationship. To this charge, Suzuki would counter­
argue that this type of struggle is precisely the cause of human misery and 
suffering, not the other way around. I will further touch on this issue later in 
this essay.
Criticizing Nishitani Keiji’s “home-ground” (the “goal-less goal” of 
Suzuki’s “nostalgic double journeys”), where “[t]he self itself returns ... by 
killing every ‘other,’ and, consequently, killing itself,” Jan Van Bragt asserts 
the importance of the rights of the Other in its asymmetrical relationship to 
the “I.” He further quotes from Levinas, the recent locus classicus of many 
critics:
If it [history] claims to integrate myself and the other within an 
impersonal spirit, this alleged integration is cruelty and injustice, 
that is, ignores the Other.
. . . the relation with the Other does not have the same status as the 
relations given to objectifying thought, where the distinction of 
terms also reflects their union. The relation between me and the 
Other does not have the structure formal logic finds in all relations. 
The terms remain absolute despite the relation in which they find 
themselves.29
29 Van Bragt 1994, p. 254.
Levinas’s asymmetrical I-Thou relationship is intriguing because it seems 
to parallel the “topological” asymmetry between the individual and the title­
less true man (mwz no shin ’nin: the “Other” in Zen), or that between life/the 
phenomenal and death/the noumenal in the soku-hi logic of reisei (spiritual­
ity). Both Suzuki and Levinas seemingly concur with each other on the issue 
of responsibility and ethics:
For instance, seeing a baby about to fall into a well, even a bad 
man who is morally lax in daily life would rush to save the baby. 
His action springs up from his unconscious; he never thinks such 
things as he should save the baby, people would praise him for 
saving it, he would be rewarded, and people would be excited and
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pleased ... [TJhis is mukuyu gyo (IPjWfr, motiveless act) or to let 
the Great Compassion (daiji daihi of jinenhoni (§
as-it-is-ness) function. Insofar as we contribute to today’s society, 
I consider mukuyu gyo to be the most important thing.30
30 SDZ 29, p. 178.
31 Levinas 1999, p. 164.
32 SDZ 27, pp. 266-67; SDZS 2, pp. 31,99.
33 SDZ 27, pp. 268-69; SDZ 29, pp. 159-61; SDZS 2, p. 99.
34 SDZS 2, p. 156.
Without knowing how to swim, to jump into the water to save 
someone is to go toward the other totally, without holding back 
anything of oneself. To give oneself totally to the other to respond 
to his unspoken request. . . his ‘Thou shalt not kill.’ But above all, 
it is no longer just a question of going toward the other when he is 
dying, but of answering with ones [src] presence the mortality of 
the living. That is the whole of ethical conduct.31
However, Levinas’s asymmetrical hospitality/love between “I” and “Thou” 
crucially differs from the “topological” asymmetry of reisei on three interre­
lated points: power, monotheism, and anthropocentrism. Suzuki points out 
that the Judeo-Christian sense of love hides a component of power because it 
issues, after all, from the monotheistic God of justice (right), who may pun­
ish sinners and destroy enemies according to his law (commandments).32 
Thus, Suzuki asserts that Jesus’ self-sacrificial love/hospitality for humani­
ty, the Other, takes the form of punishment, or better, God’s self-punish- 
ment/destruction.33 This kind of “self-punishment/destruction” by God, 
based on his righteousness, in turn seems to be reflected, for instance, in 
God’s asymmetrical/paradoxical injunction and command to Moses and 
Abraham: “Thou shalt not kill” and “Kill thy son.”
The idea of God’s “self-punishment/destruction/sacrifice” also seems 
related to the Christian injunction, “Love thy enemy,” which Suzuki finds 
inadequate because it presupposes someone or some object apart from, and 
in confrontation to, oneself; Suzuki argues that there is no enemy in the first 
place.34 This is one crucial difference of premise between the Judeo- 
Christian sense of love/ethics and that of Zen. The Judeo-Christian sense of 
love and ethics will encourage one both to love/forgive and to execute 
wrong-doers like Eichmann. Meursault in Camus’ The Stranger presumably 
refused such love and ethics as expressed in the magistrate’s words that there 
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is no repentant sinner whom God will not forgive. I see a parallel between 
the Meursault/magistrate pair and that of the Zen master and Koestler in the 
issue of love and ethics. It is not that Meursault and Zen lack God; rather 
their God is radically different from that of the magistrate and Koestler. To 
reiterate Suzuki, “Christianity begins after God has created the world, 
whereas in Buddhism, one starts with God before He has created the 
world.”35
35 SDZS 3, p. 191. The “before” and the “after” in this quote must not be conceived only in 
terms of linear time. They indicate, so to speak, a logical “before” and “after.”
36 SDZ29, p. 175.
Ill
It is this difference, I believe, that renders the Buddhist idea of “ethics”/ 
compassion non-anthropocentric (and non-dualistic), as expressed in the fol­
lowing remarks:
The other day, I [Suzuki] saw a movie scene, in which a big snake 
swallowed something like a small snake and a frog. The scene was 
so cruel that I felt like saving the frog out of the big snake’s mouth 
. . . But, snakes and lions eat [small animals] because they are hun­
gry. If we take their prey away, they in turn will be in trouble. 
However, I think that to wish to solve such a situation arises from 
our Great Compassion or, to put it more Buddhistically, from midct 
no hongan (ITKO^kfl; the original vow of the Amitabha Bud­
dha).36
On the other hand, the Judeo-Christian monotheistic God’s asymmetrical 
love/hospitality and responsibility towards the Other are highly anthro­
pocentric, as Genesis clearly declares. The Judeo-Christian sense of love and 
responsibility ultimately excludes and hierarchically degrades non-human 
beings, be they sentient or non-sentient. It seems to me that this anthro­
pocentrism is concentric with Eurocentric modernity, in which the “natives” 
of Africa, North and South Americas, and other non-European worlds have 
often been treated as sub-humans. Of course, anthropocentrism and ethno­
centrism have been universal; they are an aspect of human nature. (This is 
tantamount to saying that the dualistic, common sense thinking/mindset is a 
universal aspect of human nature. In this sense, we are all “Westerners.”) 
However, the Judeo-Christian type is one of the most fundamental and 
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systematic versions. Coupled with the Greco-Roman sensibilities, the 
Judeo-Christian anthropocentrism forms the foundation of Western moder­
nity, which, since the time of the Renaissance, has been colonizing the 
heterogeneous world (of animism, pantheism, and other sensibilities) into 
the homogeneous world of monotheism and capitalism.37
The asymmetric relationship between “homelessness” (change/samsaz-a) 
and “nostalgia” (for constancy/home/nzrvazza) in Suzuki’s Zen Buddhism, 
on the other hand, is based on the “topologically” asymmetric logic of soku- 
hi, and it takes after, for instance, the “nostalgic journey” of a Zen mendicant 
(unsui HzK, which literally means “cloud and stream”), for whom there is no 
place that is not his or her home (see also Figure 2). Hence, we often come 
across such Zen expressions as zuisho ni slut to naru (to become a master at 
any place) and omushoju nisho goshin (jESSP/r'fiffff^K'LS with no abode, one
31 Concerning the relationship between monotheism and capitalism, see Yoshizawa 1994, 
Iwai 1985, and Karatani 1995. Also see Seki 1982; Seki detects the origin of capitalism in 
Platonism and Christianity (“Platonism for the mass,” according to Nietszche). Moreover, if 
we were to follow Benedict Anderson’s arguments in his Imagined Communities, no one race 
or ethnic group would have the right, either religious or historical, to claim a land to build a 
nation-state on. See also the following dialogue between Asada Akira and Edward Said:
[Said]: Habermas is a perfect Eurocentrist. In an interview, he actually says that all 
of his assertions are not applicable outside Europe. Formation of agreement through 
dialogues by citizens with good sense sounds nice, but Palestinians are not invited 
to the dialogues.
[Asada]: If such dialogues should work, the tragedies of the nineteenth century, not 
to mention those of the twentieth century, wouldn’t have happened. Habermas’s 
theory, so to say, is a nostalgia for the excessively idealized eighteenth-century 
Europe.
[Said]: What is important is that in the theories of Habermas and his followers, dia­
logues solely appear as form. It might be a highly desirable form, but I cannot help 
sensing hollowness in it.
[Asada]: I think that Habermas’s theory of dialogue owes a lot to Arendt’s philoso­
phy, especially her interpretation of Kant. Of course, Arendt herself leans too much 
towards European humanism. In spite of that, however, her view that in thinking 
about “human rights,” one must start, first of all, with the situation of those who are 
chased out of their countries, like, for instance, the Jews during World War II, con­
tains a truthfulness based on a historical experience, unlike that of Habermas type 
formalists or the cynical “human rightists.” As far as this view of hers goes, I hold 
Arendt in high esteem. I believe that it is from the standpoint of the Jews who were 
chased out of a public space that she puts importance on a public space for dia­
logues. I think that standpoint is also that of the present-day Palestinians. (Asada 
1994, pp. 75-76.) 
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attains satori). The spirit/logic of soku-hi also underlies the Buddhist idea of 
rin ’ne transmigration) and its correlate, the Bodhisattva ideal of com­
passion (bosatsu gyo #Hfr), both of which, for instance, the Noh play 
Yamanba (ilf^; Mountain Crone) beautifully exemplifies.38 Suzuki’s “nos­
talgic double journeys” also exemplify all these elements, and thus they are 
journeys not only to traditional “Japan” (past/non-dualism/the noumenal), 
but also to the modem “West” (future/dualism/the phenomenal).
38 See Suzuki’s “ ‘ Yama-uba,’ a Nd Play” in his Zen and Japanese Culture.
39 Maraldo 1994, p. 340.
40 See note 37.
It is from this kind of comparative perspective that we should reconsider, 
for instance, Maraldo’s following misdirected criticism against Suzuki and 
his idea of “Japanese spirituality” (nihonteki reisei):
Any difference between an essentially Japanese spirituality and an 
ideological Japanese spirit is lost to us. We look for diversity and 
historical conditioning in religious expressions, not for a privi­
leged experience that might be the unchanging core of a tradition. 
The attempt to express a core in “Western” as well as “Eastern” 
terms finds sympathy no longer. We question the centrality of sin­
gular voices of authority . . . Finally, we labor to establish non­
Japanese voices of authority on Japanese Buddhism, and our 
efforts there vie with the Western tradition of hearing in Suzuki a 
guru of the East.39
Maraldo’s criticism appears to exemplify the recent “deconstructionist,” 
“dialogic,” and “postcolonial” trend that seemingly advocates “non-mono­
logic and non-Eurocentric” impartial approaches to different cultures. While 
I consider the trend itself to be legitimate, I also wonder if it is used at times 
to mask a strong crypto-Eurocentrism, which represents nothing more than a 
Habermasian (and perhaps a Kantian) modernist ideology of “(Western) 
modernity as an unfinished project.” The hidden agenda of such a project, it 
seems to me, is to bulldoze the heterogeneous world into homogeneous 
Western modernity and civilization under the slogan, “globalization.”40 
Behind the apparently impartial mask of this kind of globalization may lie an 
Orientalist condescension and complacency towards the non-West, which is 
actually the white man’s burden mentality in disguise.
While Levinas’s sophisticated sense of asymmetrical love/hospitality and
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ethics may differ from Habermasian Eurocentrism, it can nevertheless be 
fatally Eurocentric in its anthropocentric and monotheistic theology, because 
it excludes other non-anthropocentric and non-monotheistic sensibilities 
such as those of pantheism and Zen (Zen, of course, must not simplistically 
be identified with pantheism).41
41 See also the following:
“Universal humanity” exists nowhere than in one’s ideological thinking, which dis­
guises one’s own prejudice as impartiality. The interior of a human being is formed 
historically and differently in each culture, depending on the way the individual and 
his or her community are related with each other. We cannot carelessly bundle 
together the interior of the people who live in the Christian and Islamic societies 
(which officially uphold the belief in the monotheistic, absolute God) and that of the 
Japanese since the Edo period. (Momokawa 2000, p. 11.)
42 SDZ 20, pp. 160-62. Suzuki also puts this point as follows:
Zen annihilates all concepts, all consciousness, all relationships, and all subjects 
and objects. Therefore, all consciousness, all concepts, all relationships, and all sub­
jects and objects undeniably exist. This is obviously a logical contradiction, because 
being and non-being exist at the same time. Thus, myopic people regard Zen as 
delusion and nonsense. However, why is it that they themselves are performing this 
delusion and nonsense without questioning their contradiction? Nay, why is it that 
no matter how much they make a fuss over their contradiction, they cannot eternal­
ly escape from their contradiction? Zen calls this “binding oneself with no rope” 
(mujo jibaku Bi'TN A). (Suzuki 1899a, p. 39.)
Based on the foregoing examinations, I consider that what Koestler, Sharf, 
Ives, Maraldo, and others may believe to be Zen’s passive quietism, the lack 
of social ethics based on the sense of Alterity (Otherness), is in fact a carica­
ture of Zen. Their misunderstanding is imposed on Zen by their modem 
“Western” homogeneous and narrow sense of identity, or by their Levinasian 
sense of ethics, which can be equally homogeneous and parochial in its 
monotheistic/universalistic theology. I also think that when Maraldo and 
others criticize Suzuki’s idea of “Japanese spirituality” as nostalgic “cultur­
al nationalism/essentialism,” this is a rather limited view, which perhaps 
arises from their crypto-Eurocentrism.
To reiterate, Suzuki points out time and again the ultimate futility of the 
commotion and busyness of “Western” ethics and love, which only focus on 
the state that follows the creation/separation of God and the world, God and 
the devil.42 Suzuki would argue that this conception of ethics and love is vain 
and even complacent because it is ironically the type of dualistic approach
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advanced by Koestler, Sharf, Ives, and Maraldo that aggravates and ampli­
fies the violence, destruction, and resultant misery and suffering of 
humankind and other sentient beings. This misery and suffering form a 
vicious circle since they further necessitate this type of meddling, or what 
such critics would call “social ethical interference,” with the core problems.
IV
This statement, however, does not simplistically mean that Zen is pacifist (in 
the usual sense), or that it can solve all the problems of humankind. What 
Zen can do, in my view, is not necessarily to eliminate human suffering, but 
to save us from prematurely and complacently believing that ethics are 
opposed to evil. (The irony of this complacent belief is that it makes ethics 
and evil “bite” each other, thereby causing piercing pain and suffering to 
humanity. Zen, so to speak, is a way to turn this kind of “bite” into a “nip,” 
on both of which I will further touch later on.) Zen’s view/premise, it seems 
to me, is not that we need ethics because we have problems/evils (i. e., 
because we fell, or better, because God separated himself from the devil), but 
that we have problems because we have ethics; or, to be more precise, prob- 
lems/evil and ethics/good are co-arising like the “two sides” of the Mobius 
band. The soku-hi logic (God is God because God is not-God) is the funda­
mental component of this view.
Zen’s soku-hi logic can also deal effectively with Sharf’s charge that 
Suzuki’s Zen is a modem construct. Soku-hi logic deconstructs such binary 
thinking as construct/illusion vs. truth/reality. Ultimately, what is not “con­
struct” in human affairs? In Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism (published as 
early as 1907), Suzuki refutes the charge that Mahayana Buddhism is a devi­
ation from the Buddha’s original teachings. Suzuki argues that no religion 
with vibrant life, be it Buddhism or Christianity, can remain static; it changes 
and grows dynamically, thereby maintaining its “original” spirit.43 How­
ever, this statement should not be confused, as in Sharf, with a mere “apolo­
getic distinction drawn between the ‘essence’ of a tradition—the source from 
which a tradition springs—and the cultural forms through which it is made 
known.”44 Suzuki’s point is based on the soku-hi logic (which also underlies 
Basho’s idea offueki ryiiko or “constancy in change”), which does
43 Suzuki 1963, pp. 11-16.
44 Sharf 1994, p. 45.
not allow simplistic, Platonic and Neo-Platonic oppositions such as the 
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“noumenon (origin)” and the “phenomenon (manifestation)” or “content” 
and “form.”
“Modernist” in his own way, Suzuki throughout his life strongly advocat­
ed cleansing conventional religions of superstitions, correcting social injus­
tice (including inequalities between men and women as well as between the 
rich and the poor), and improving society through science, technology, and 
other rationalistic, progressive, and liberal sensibilities of the Western 
Enlightenment.45 As mentioned earlier, Suzuki is very critical of what he 
perceives as Japan’s irrational and obsolete Emperor system and Japanese 
militarism, which culminated in the Pacific War. Of Japan’s defeat in the 
war, Suzuki comments that Japan was not defeated by American materialism 
but by the American spirit which he sees represented in the [gleaming] 
fuselages of the B-29 bombers that flew over his cottage on a hilltop in 
Kamakura towards the end of the war.46 (This will largely modify Sharf s 
hasty charge that Suzuki and Zen categorically regard and criticize the West 
as materialistic.)47
45 SDZ 17, pp. 169-82; SDMS, pp. 257-58 , 260-62, 264, 270; Yamamoto 1898, p. 29; 
Unno 1997, p. 264.
46 Suzuki Shigenobu 1969. Also see SDZ 32, p. 274.
47 Sharf 1994, pp. 46, 47. See also the following remarks by Suzuki:
I do not consider materialistic progress to be [human] arrogance, but rather I con­
sider it to be a prerequisite for our free spiritual activities. I believe that removing 
the obstacles which nature sets against humans’ material existence arises from the 
human desire for spiritual freedom. (SDMS, p. 257.)
We should be aware that Suzuki’s logic of soku-hi “topologically” synthesizes spirit and 
matter. Zen’s down-to-earthness, which arises from soku-hi logic, is a kind of materialism.
48 Like other critics, such as Ives and Sharf, Maraldo’s criticism of Zen and Suzuki is often 
based on misinformation and/or one-sided views on Zen and Suzuki’s ideas. For example, 
contrary to Maraldo’s assertion that Suzuki’s idea of reisei (spirituality) is relatively new 
(Maraldo 1994, p. 337) [and thus hides the hidden agenda of cultural nationalism— 
Hagiwara’s interpretation], Suzuki had used this concept, if not in exactly the same sense as 
in his Nihonteki reisei, as early as 1896 (SDZ 23, pp. 142-143, 145). Suzuki also uses the 
word, reisei in his translation of Swedenborg’s Angelic Wisdom Concerning the Divine Love 
and the Divine Wisdom (SDZ 25, pp. 63, 138). Also, I think that Maraldo is one-sided when 
he argues that Suzuki proposed an idealized religiosity [i.e., Japanese spirituality] in the belief 
that the Western world was overcome by materialism (Ibid., p. 340). As can be surmised from
It is in this wider context that I believe we need to view Suzuki’s Japanese 
spirituality (nihonteki reisei), which Maraldo criticizes as a cultural/spiritu­
al nationalism 48 In the first place, Suzuki’s soku-hi logic supports the idea of
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cultural “uniqueness”49; in the second place, the argument that I put forward 
in this essay suggests that even at present, the Western understanding of Zen 
has remained essentially static since the 1950s, the time of Koestler. This, of 
course, is not to say that Westerners are incapable of understanding Zen. 
Suzuki certainly would not have subscribed to such a view. If such had been 
his view, how could one explain the numerous volumes of his writing on Zen 
in English and his frequent visits to America and Europe to lecture on it until 
nearly the last moment of his death at the age of ninety-five?50 Upon his 
return from one of these visits, when a former Japanese student of Suzuki 
asked him, “Could Americans understand Zen at all?” he immediately 
responded: “Doyon understand it?”51 Suzuki’s higan (KII), or earnest wish 
was to communicate to the West and the rest of the world (including his own 
country) the Zen sensibility, which he justifiably thought was best preserved 
and developed in what he called “Japanese spirituality,”52 and this wish, I 
believe, is a legitimate impulse that issues forth from Buddhist compassion 
(spirituality).53 Suzuki’s “nostalgic double journeys” also stem from this 
Buddhist compassion (or bosatsudd the Bodhisattva ideal), which
(“topologically”) manifests “past” and “future” simultaneously, both oso 
(tiffi; “nostalgic journey” to the noumenal/non-dualistic “past” of Buddhist 
satori/nirvana) and genso (iSfii; “nostalgic journey” back to the “future” of 
the dualistic phenomenal and the mundane).
the episode of the B-29 bombers, Suzuki’s view of the West is far more sophisticated than 
Maraldo envisages.
49 See also note 41.
50 See also Suzuki’s idea on “Eastern” and “Western” mindsets quoted in the introductory 
part of this essay.
51 Matsukata 1975.
52 There is a parallel between “Japanese spirituality” and other elements of Japanese cul­
ture, such as haiku and sushi. They are unique to Japanese culture, but can be appreciated and 
enjoyed by anyone in the world.
53 Here, one may see, together with critics like Maraldo (1994, p. 338), a tautology in my, 
and by extension, Suzuki’s logic: spirituality issues forth from spirituality. We must not for­
get, however, that this seeming “tautology” or a kind of self-referentiality is based on, or 
rather, issues forth from, the paradoxical logic of soku-hi (A is A because A is not-A). In my 
view, Suzuki expresses this apparent tautology and self-contradiction as “go ga go oyaburu”
karma breaks karma [itself]) (SDZ 29, pp. 174, 176-77). To put it differently, 
“God is God because God is not God.” Herein lies, according to Suzuki, the radical source of 
the Mahayana sense of compassion and “ethics.” This is also the source of the “nip” rather 
than the “bite,” on which I will touch below.
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V
To conclude, I would like to reiterate that Buddhist compassion/ “ethics” as 
it emanates from the soku-hi logic must not be confused with or judged by 
the fundamentally dualistic “Western” sense of love and ethics. Zen does not 
strive to become a panacea for evils. A “Western” sense of ethics regards 
evils as, so to speak, a “bite,” whereas Zen is a way to see them as a “nip” 
(no pun intended). According to Anthony Wilden,
[t]he ‘nip’ is paradoxical. It is not a ‘presence made of absence’, 
but something far more complicated and significant. Without any 
use of negation, it says: ‘The sign which is now being communi­
cated does not denote what would be denoted by the same act (the 
bite) which this act (the nip) denotes.’54
54 Wilden 1977, pp. 151-52.
A “presence made of absence” is the “bite,” where eternity and time or the 
infinite and the finite “cross/bite” each other (see Figure 1). It is Hitler’s 
concentration camps seen from the Levinasian sense of ethics; it is also 
Eliot’s “still point of the turning world” in the midst of the bombing of 
London by V-II rockets. The “nip,” so to speak, “deconstructs” and “dis­
joints” (see Figure 2) the “biting” pain into “nipping play.” Of course, this 
does not mean that the “biting” pain decreases or disappears (in the common 
sense). One expects such a decrease or disappearance in the dualistic realm 
after God separated light (good) from darkness (evil). The elbow does not 
bend outward. This is what the Zen monk Ryokan ft/Jf (1758-1831) meant 
in saying that the best way to deal with calamities is to meet them. This is 
also what Hakuin g® (1685-1768), another Zen monk, meant when he said: 
“Enlisting the help of other foolish saints, one tries to fill the well [of suffer­
ing] with snow.” “Nip” in Zen “ethics” is not to negate interference (i.e., 
ethical acts); rather, it points to the paradox of the ultimate futility of inter­
ference without the sense of its ultimate futility. In other words, God is God 
because God is not God, or, to quote an anonymous haiku:
Hama made wa 
Ama mo mino kirn 
Shigure kana
® £ T Id Up to the beach,
MUtmS/A Even the divers wear a straw raincoat:
The autumn rain!
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It is in this kind of context that we should read Suzuki’s seemingly shocking 
remarks: “[Zen] may be found wedded to anarchism or fascism, communism 
or democracy, atheism or idealism, or any political or economic dogma­
tism.”55 With his Mahayana Boddhisattva ideal of compassion, Suzuki 
deplored the then-escalating arms race between Soviet Russia and America, 
but at the same time he said that the extinction of humankind through nuclear 
wars might also be acceptable.56 I think that Suzuki’s apparent contradiction 
makes perfect sense as soku-hi logic, based on the “topological moment” of 
the creation and destruction of the entire universe. We must not forget that 
Zen’s seemingly benign idyllic image as expressed in such sayings asyawa- 
gi wa midori, hana wa kurenai (WiS, willow is green and flower is
57 SDZ 28, p. 555.
red) and hibi kore kdjitsu (0 A 0; every day is a good day) is “topologi­
cally” one and the same with a cosmic holocaust. Suzuki says:
Peace in the realm of spirituality (rezsez) transcends the extinction 
of humankind or some such. It is irrelevant to whatever scientists 
or historians say. This is because the peace I am talking about is 
not affected by the length of time nor the width of space. Unless 
we gain this kind of peace, no matter how much we make the com­
motion of a peace movement, it will end up being the hollow noise 
of a trumpet.57
It is only through this kind of radical thought, I believe, that we can effec­
tively address the hidden complacency of the “Western” sense of love and 
ethics, which fails to face its ironic propensity to engender and support the 
very evils it seeks to counter. Suzuki’s “nostalgic double journeys” both to 
“Japanese spirituality” and to the “modem West,” a manifestation of his 
Bodhisattva ideal based on the soku-hi logic, will enable us to see these 
unsolvable “evils” not as ironical “bites,” but as profoundly paradoxical 
“nips.”
55 Suzuki 1959, p. 63.
56 SDZ 27, p. 264; SDZ 28, p. 549; SDZS 3, p. 287-88. This will effectively refute stereo­
typical caricatures of Zen as exemplified in the following passage:
They [the purveyors of Zen] blithely cite Joshu’s injunction to “wash your bowls,” 
and insist that true Zen is to be found in the midst of daily activity—in “chopping 
wood and carrying water.” ... (Note that the examples of “daily activities” invariably 
recall the tranquil existence of a medieval forest monastery, rather than the unrelent­
ing technologized chaos of modem urban life.) (Sharf 1994, p. 50.)
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Abbreviations
SDMS Suzuki Daisetsu mikokai shokan
SDZ Suzuki Daisetsu zenshu
SDZS Suzuki Daisetsu zadan shu
REFERENCES
Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso.
Asada Akira \99A.“Rekishi no owari” to seiki matsu no sekai j tttt
SA® 1k fl. Tokyo: Shogakukan.
Bloch, Ernst. 1985. Geist der Utopie. Second Edition. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Hakamaya Noriaki 1990. Hihan bukkyd fit WAS. Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan.
-------- . 1989. Hongakushiso hihan A^SJSfitfl. Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan.
Heisig, James W. and John C. Maraldo, eds. 1994. Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, 
& the Question of Nationalism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Hirata Seiko 1994. “Zen Buddhist Attitudes to War.” In Heisig and Maraldo, eds.,
Rude Awakenings, pp. 3-15.
Ichikawa Hakugen rffJIIS'jJ. 1993. Ichikawa Hakugen chosakushu rfrJHSiSWfMft. vol. 4. 
Kyoto: Hozokan.
Ives, Christopher. 1994. “Ethical Pitfalls in Imperial Zen and Nishida Philosophy: Ichikawa 
Hakugen’s Critique.” In Heisig and Maraldo, eds., Rude Awakenings, pp. 16-39.
Iwai Katsuhito A-AA. 1985. “Yoshizawa Hidenari Kahei to shdcho” WAAA 
frit! in Venlsu no shonin no shihonron AOWASn. Tokyo: Chikuma
Shobo.
Karatani Kojin 1995. Architecture as Metaphor: Language, Number, Money. Tr.
Sabu Kohso. Ed. Michael Speaks. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Kirita Kiyohide 1994. “D. T. Suzuki on Society and the State.” In Heisig and
Maraldo, eds., Rude Awakenings, pp. 52-74.
Koestler, Arthur. 1961.The Lotus and the Robot. New York: Macmillan.
Levinas, Emmannuel. 1999. Alterity and Transcendence. Tr. Michael B. Smith. New York: 
Columbia University Press.
Maraldo, John C. 1994. “Questioning Nationalism Now and Then: A Critical Approach to 
Zen and the Kyoto School.” In Heisig and Maraldo, eds., Rude Awakenings, pp. 
333-62.
Matsukata Saburo 1975. “Kokoro yutakana kokusaijin” 'L'SZhZsIBISA. In
Nishitani Keiji, ed., Kaiso: Suzuki Daisetsu SpAAfifi. Tokyo: Shunjusha.
Matsumoto Shiro 1989. Engi to kit: nyoraizd shisd hihan ScfHAS:
Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan.
Momokawa Takahito 2000. Nihon no erotishizumu YZlA. Tokyo:
Chikuma Shobo.
150
HAGIWARA: JAPAN AND THE WEST IN D.T. SUZUKI
Seki Hirono MWSf. 1982. Puraton to shihonshugi 1/9 E > t A±S. Tokyo: Hokuto 
Shuppan.
Sharf, Robert H. 1994. “Whose Zen? Zen Nationalism Revisited.” In Heisig and Maraldo, 
eds., Rude Awakenings, pp. 40-51.
Stinnett, Robert B. 2000. Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor. New York: 
The Free Press.
Suzuki, D. T. 1899a. “Mozo roku” Nihonjin 0 AJv. No. 61, pp. 37-41.
-------- . 1899b. “Tabi no tsurezure” Rikugd zasshi AMSSf*. No. 210, pp. 
68-73.
-------- . 1899c. “Tabi no tsurezure.” Rikugo zasshi AMSStci. No. 211, pp. 71-75.
-------- . 1959. Zen and Japanese Culture. New York: Princeton University Press.
-------- . 1963. Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism. New York: Schocken Books.
-------- . 1968-71. Suzuki Daisetsu zenshit InAAAAM. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
-------- . 1970-71. Suzuki Daisetsu zadanshii SpAtMHlI®®!*. vols. 2-3. Tokyo: Yomiuri 
Shinbunsha.
-------- . 1989. Suzuki Daisetsu mikokai shokan JriAAftbAAUtllrffi. Kyoto: Zenbunka 
Kenkyujo.
Suzuki Shigenobu £t> AM IB. 1969. “Daihi no hito” T#.®A. “Geppo” fl December. SDZ 
24.
Unno, Taitetsu. 1997. “The Past as a Problem of the Present: Zen, the Kyoto School, and 
Nationalism.” The Eastern Buddhist, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 245-66.
Van Bragt, Jan. 1994. “Kyoto Philosophy—Intrinsically Nationalistic?” In Heisig and 
Maraldo, eds., Rude Awakenings, pp. 233-54.
Wilden, Anthony. 1977. System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange. 
London: Tavistock.
Yamamoto Ryokichi Lil AM M. 1898. “Ryosei no kosai” Nihonjin H A A. No. 55,
pp. 27-32.
Yoshizawa Hidemarirf ArflUE 1994. Kahei to shocho Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo.
151
